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Abstract 
 
MDEA: Malware Detection with Evolutionary Adversarial Learning 
Xiruo Wang, M.S.Comp.Sc 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
                
                    Supervisor: Risto Miikkulainen 
 
Many applications have used machine learning as a tool to detect malware. These 
applications take in raw or processed binary data to feed neural network models to classify 
benign or malicious files. Even though this approach has proved effective against dynamic 
changes, such as encrypting, obfuscating and packing techniques, it is vulnerable to 
specific evasion attacks to where that small changes to the input data cause 
misclassification at test time. In this paper, I propose MDEA, an Adversarial Malware 
Detection model that combines a neural network and evolutionary optimization attack 
samples to make the network robust against evasion attacks. By retraining the model with 
the evolved malware samples, network performance improves a big margin. 
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     Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
The high proliferation of and dependence on computing resources in daily life has 
not only greatly increased the potential of malware to harm consumers but has also 
significantly increased the attack space (Acquisti et al. 2010). It is estimated that almost 
one in four computers operating in the U.S. were already infected by malware in 2008 
(Plonk et al. 2008) and according to Kaspersky Lab, up to one billion dollars was stolen 
from financial institutions worldwide due to malware attacks in 2015 (K. Lab 2015). More 
recently, the notorious and widespread NotPetya ransomware attack is estimated to have 
caused $10 billion dollars in damages worldwide. Even worse, as reported by McAfee 
Labs, the diversity of malware is still evolving in expanding areas such that in Q1 2018, 
on average, five new malware samples were generated per second (Beek et al. 2018). As a 
specific example, total coin miner malware rose by 629% in Q1 to more than 2.9 million 
samples in 2018 (Beek et al. 2018). 
As a result of the magnitude of the threat posed by malware, a great deal of research 
has been conducted on the problem of malware identification. At the moment there are two 
widely used approaches for malware detection: dynamic analysis, which obtains features 
by monitoring program executions and static analysis, which obtains feature from binary 
programs without running them. Intuitively, the dynamic analysis will be the first choice, 
since it can provide us the most accurate program behavior data. However, there are many 
issues in dynamic analysis in practice. Dynamic analysis requires a specially constructed 
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running environment such as a customized Virtual Machine (VM), which will be a huge 
computational burden to test numerous samples. Furthermore, in order to bypass this 
defense, some malwares will alter the behaviors when they are detected (Raffetseder et al. 
2015, Garfinkel et al. 2007). Even the malwares don't change its behavior during the 
detection process, the analysis environment can get false positive data that may result from 
other software. 
On the other hand, the static analysis methods also have their disadvantages. The 
signature-based method, in which malware features are extracted by computer security 
experts, provides the basis for most commercial antivirus products. While they are widely 
used, static pattern analysis (Reddy et al. 2006, Narouei 2015) (like API calls, N-grams, 
and so on) is limited in their ability to combat various encryption, polymorphism and 
obfuscation methods used by malware attackers. As for machine learning based malware 
classification technologies, several successful attempts (Rieck 2011, Zakeri 2015) have 
been applied to malware detection, which rely heavily on relevant domain knowledge for 
to provide malware analysis and determine features. This approach cannot adapt to fast-
changing malware patterns and comes with the high cost of artificial feature engineering. 
In recent years, researchers have begun exploring a new frontier in data mining and 
machine learning known as deep learning. Deep learning techniques are now being 
leveraged in malware detection and classification tasks, (Hardy et al. 2016, Gibert 2016, 
Drew et al. 2017, Yan et al. 2018) for exploring SAE, CNN, and RNN models to devise 
malware detection architectures. Although research thus far has provided promising 
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results, there are still many open challenges and opportunities for DL to improve 
performance in malware identification and classification tasks. First of all, due to the quick 
increase in the amount of novel malware, malicious techniques and patterns are changing 
and evolving rapidly. As a result, handling novel malware is one of the most pressing issues 
that deep learning methods might handle. In addition, in contrast to the natural language 
processing or computer vision tasks that are usually explored in deep learning tasks, 
malware byte files and assembly instructions have less understandable patterns. The 
difficulty of adapting these traditional deep learning methods directly to the task of 
malware classification and identification brings us to further explore data prepossessing 
techniques for network inputs. Furthermore, the adversarial attacks against neural 
networks, which only manipulate small portion of the input data and causes 
misclassification, has been proven to be one of the biggest vulnerabilities of DL. Even 
though these types of adversarial attack are less common on malware detection models 
because of the complexity and fragility of binary executables, there have been research 
shown that evading deep neural network for malware binary detection is possible. In their 
work, they trained a gradient-based model to append bytes to the overlay section of 
malware samples. Even though the model successfully evaded the deep neural network, 
both the model and the modification method are rather simple and cannot cover the 
complicated modifications real malware writers do. 
In order to explore the data space more thoroughly, an action space is defined. The 
action space consists of 10 different modification methods of binary programs. On top of 
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that, an evolutionary optimization is used to search the best action sequence of a specific 
malware since many researches have shown that evolutionary learning sup 
In this paper, I propose MDEA, an Adversarial Malware Detection model that 
combines a deep neural network and an evolutionary optimization. MDEA consists of a 
convolutional neural network that classifies raw byte data from malware binaries, and an 
evolutionary optimization that modifies the malwares that are detected. In contrast to 
simply append bytes to the end of each file, an action space is defined for the evolutionary 
optimization to pick from and choose best action sequences for each malware sample. With 
the evolutionary learning, the probability that the generated input sample is classified as 
benign can be maximally increased. The new samples then will be fed into the detection 
network for retraining. These three steps form a cycle that is similar to Generative 
Adversarial Nets (GAN) (Goodfellow et al. 2014). 
The experiments are performed on 7371 Windows Portable Executable (PE) 
malware samples and 6917 benign PE samples. The results show that MDEA not only 
drastically decreases the detection model accuracy, but also increases the overall detection 
performance from 90% to 93% after the retrain process. With this result I aim to claim that 
adversarial evolutionary training can improve both the robustness and the performance of 
malware detection network. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the related work. 
Chapter 3 describes the overview of my malware detection system and the details of each 
component. Chapter 4 describes my experimental setups and discuss the results. Finally, 
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Chapter 5 draws conclusions for my experiment and Chapter 6 provides suggestions for 
further research on this topic.
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Chapter 2:  Related Work 
Malware detection and classification has been a well-studied problem for many 
years. Notably, in 2015, the open Kaggle Contest: Microsoft Malware Classification 
Challenge (BIG 2015) (Kaggle, 2015) created a large burst of energy and attention towards 
the goal of malware classification. The champion of this contest used machine learning 
with sophisticated static pattern analysis in order to achieve high accuracy in classifying 
the malware samples provided in the challenge. Observing this, my goal is to leverage deep 
learning models without sophisticated feature engineering. In this section, I briefly 
introduce related works in signature-based, learning-based (Yan et al. 2018), adversarial-
based (Anderson et al. 2018) approaches and evolutionary techniques. 
 
2.1 Signature-based Malware Detection 
Signature-based and behavior-based methods are widely used in the anti-malware 
industry and are often used to identify “known” malware (Cloonan 2017). When an anti-
malware solution provider identifies an object as malicious, its signature is added to a 
database of known malware. These repositories may contain hundreds of millions of 
signatures that identify malicious objects.  One of the major advantages of signature-based 
malware detection is its thoroughness since it follows all conceivable execution ways of a 
given document (Souri et al. 2018). Because of the simplicity of building such a system, 
signature-based malware detection has been the primary identification technique used by 
malware products and remains the base approach used by the latest firewalls, email and 
network gateways. Therefore, many researches have been done in this field. Santos et al. 
(2010) created an opcode sequence-based malware detection system. Preda et al. (2007) 
proposed a semantics-based framework for reasoning about malware detector. Chaumette 
et al. (2011) created an automated virus signature extraction system with abstract 
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interpretation. Ojugo and Eboka (2019) investigated detection of metamorphic malware 
attacks using the Boyer Moore algorithm for string-based signature detection scheme. 
Venugopal and Hu (2008) showed that a signature matching algorithm can be suitable for 
use in mobile device scanning due to its low memory requirements. Fan et al. (2015) 
expanded the normal signature approaches to the API log domain and utilized with data 
mining techniques. Fraley and Figueroa (2016) presented a unique approach leveraging 
topological examination using signature-based techniques. They also used data mining 
techniques in order to uncover and spotlight the properties of malicious files. Despite the 
widespread adoption of signature-based malware detection within the information security 
industry, malware authors can easily evade this signature-based method through techniques 
such as encryption, polymorphism, and obfuscation. Signature-based analysis is, therefore, 
poorly equipped to handle the current state of malware generation. 
 
 
2.2 Learning-based Malware Classification 
 
Because of the weaknesses of signature-based malware detection, machine 
learning is a popular approach to signatureless malware detection. Many different 
malware detection approaches using machine learning technology have been proposed in 
recent years, such as static analysis, which learns statistical characteristics (e.g. API calls, 
N-grams), or dynamic behavior analysis, which analyzes the behavior of a system against 
a baseline in order to determine anomalous (and possibly malicious) behavior. I focus on 
static analysis within the scope of this paper. In the Kaggle Microsoft Malware Contest 
(Kaggle 2015), the winner used many sophisticated features for their knn model in order 
to achieve high performance. Some other machine learning techniques are also studied in 
different works. Elkhawas et al. (2018) proposed a machine learning model with Support 
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Vector Machine (SVM). Wang et al. (2015) developed an automatic malware detection 
system by training an SVM classifier based on behavioral signatures and across-
validation scheme was used for solving classification accuracy problems by using SVMs 
associated with 60 families of real malware. Rehman et al. (2018) have reverse 
engineered the Android Apps to extract manifest files, and employed machine learning 
algorithms to efficiently detect malwares. They observed that SVM in case of binaries 
and KNN in case of manifest.xml files are the most suitable options in robustly detecting 
the malware in Android devices. Altaher (2016) proposed a hybrid neuro-fuzzy classifier 
(EHNFC) for Android malware classification using permission-based features. The 
proposed EHNFC not only has the capability of detecting obfuscated malware using 
fuzzy rules but can also evolve its structure by learning new malware detection fuzzy 
rules to improve its detection accuracy when used in detection of more malware 
applications. Yuan et al. (2016) proposed to associate the features from the static analysis 
with features from dynamic analysis of Android apps and characterize malware using 
deep learning techniques. Yuxin and Siyi (2017) presented a deep belief network (DBN) 
that represents malware as opcode sequences. DBNs can use unlabeled data to pretrain a 
multi-layer generative model, which can better represent the characteristics of data 
samples. 
Unlike all the above research works, in order to cut down on the necessity of 
expert analysis, I will only take the basic features as input for deep learning model. Many 
different deep learning models have been proposed on malware detection. Some people 
intend to solve this problem by LSTM model (Yan 2018), while others proposed 
"malware image" that are generally constructed by treating each byte of the binary as a 
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gray-scale pixel value, and defining an arbitrary “image width” that is used for all 
images. From all these approaches, I found that the MalConv network (Raff et al. 2017), 
which use raw byte embeddings as the input, achieved the highest accuracy. Therefore, I 
choose to use this model as my detection model. 
 
2.3 Adversarial Model for Sample Generation 
 
Nguyen et al. ‘s paper (2015) arguably inspired the later research on adversarial 
model. They found that it was easy to produce images that were completely unrecognizable 
to humans, but deep neural networks (DNNs) could recognize it with high confidence. 
They trained DNN on ImageNet and MNIST datasets and produced many human-
unrecognizable images. Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed the first generative adversarial 
nets (GAN). GAN consists of two models. One of the models is the generative model, 
which captures the data distribution and a discriminative model that estimates the 
probability that a sample came from the training data rather than from generative model. 
GAN has a very huge potential since it can learn to mimic any data distribution 
because of the generality of its structure. Therefore, GAN has been used in many domains 
such as computer vision, natural language processing etc. Zhu et al. (2017) used cycle GAN 
to build a mapping function from two image domains. Karras et al. (2018) proposed a way 
to modify the network structures for both generator and discriminator in GAN. The method 
they used greatly increased the variation in generated images. 
Recent work in adversarial machine learning has shown that deep learning models 
for machine learning are susceptible to gradient-based attacks. Anderson (Anderson et al. 
2018) proposed a more general framework based on reinforcement learning (RL) for 
attacking static portable executable (PE) anti-malware engines. They show in experiments 
that this adversarial learning method can attack a gradient-boosted machine learning model 
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and evade components of publicly hosted antivirus engines. Suciu et al. explored the area 
of adversarial examples for malware detection by training an existing model on a 
production-scale dataset. They showed that some previous attacks are less effective than 
initially reported, while simultaneously highlighting architectural weaknesses that 
facilitate new attack strategies for malware classification. Grosse et al. (2017) expanded on 
existing adversarial example crafting algorithms to construct a highly effective attack that 
uses adversarial examples against malware detection models.  Maiorca et al. (2019) 
presented a system to generate malwares embedded in PDF files. Kolosnjaji et al. (2018) 
proposed a gradient-based attack model that is capable of evading a deep network by only 
changing few specific bytes at the end of each malware sample, while preserving its 
intrusive functionality. This work is interesting because they used the same malware 
detection network structure (MalConv) and similar approach as mine. They showed that 
by simply appending learnt bytes at the end of malware samples, they were able to decrease 
the detection accuracy by more than 50%. Even though this work achieved good result, 
neither of them used their generated attack samples to improve the detection model. Their 
learning methods are also mathematically unsophisticated, which may result in nonoptimal 
solution. 
I will reproduce and improve upon the methods in these paper with evolutionary 
learning and leverage the generated adversarial samples back to the deep learning model 
to further improve the accuracy. 
 
 
2.4 Evolutionary Algorithm 
 
 
Evolutionary algorithm (EA) uses mechanisms inspired by biological evolution, 
such as mutation, recombination and selection to select the best individual of a population 
to solve an optimization problem. At the beginning, EA is considered as a scalable 
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alternative to reinforcement learning (Salimans et al. 2017). In recent years, there have 
been many researches showed that EA performed much better than traditional optimizing 
method such as gradient descend in different domain (Real et al. 2019; Podryabinkin et 
al. 2019). This advantage of EA has been proven even more in machine and deep 
learning because of the diversity and complexity it provides (Young et al. 2015; Hooman 
et al. 2018). Martín et al. (2016) created an Android malware detection system with 
evolutionary strategies to leverag third-party calls to bypass the effects of these 
concealment strategies.  Petroski et al. (2018) evolved the weights of a DNN with genetic 
algorithm (GA) and it performed well on hard deep RL problems, including Atari and 
humanoid locomotion. Esteban et al. (2019) evolved an image classifier— AmoebaNet-
A—that surpassed hand-designs for the first time. They modified the tournament 
selection evolutionary algorithm by introducing an age property to favor the younger 
genotypes. They also showed that their evolved model worked well in their benchmark 
against reinforcement learning approaches. Chen et al. (2019) built a model to generate 
groundwater spring potential map. They utilized GA to perform a feature selection 
procedure and data mining methods for optimizing set of variables in groundwater spring 
assessments. 
In all the above literatures, EA showed a great advantage against the traditional 
optimization method such as stochastic gradient descent and reinforcement learning. The 
gradient-free nature makes EA less vulnerable to local minimum issue and easier to 
approach more general solutions for a complicated parameter search problem. EA also 
has higher robustness and performs well when the number of time steps in an episode is 
long, where actions have long-lasting effects, or if no good value function estimates 
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are available (Salimans et al. 2017). Therefore I chose EA as the optimization method for 
my project. 
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Chapter 3: Model 
This chapter discusses the design and process of my proposed MDEA model. 
Section 3.1 describes an overview of the model structure. Section 3.2 discusses the dataset 
information and the details of the detection model. Section 3.3 explains the definition and 
details of action space, which is used by evolutionary optimization method. Finally, Section 
3.4 describes the evolutionary optimization algorithm in details. 
 
3.1 Structure Overview 
 
 
Figure 1: Model Diagram 
This diagram shows the overall model flow of MDEA.  
Top: Detection Model based on the MalConv network Raff et al (2017). 
Bottom: The Evolutionary Optimization Algorithm 
 
 Overall, the malware detection process consists of two major parts. A diagram of 
our model is shown in Figure 1. The first part involves preprocessing malware sample data 
and feeding these data to our 1-D Convolutional network. The second part uses 
evolutionary optimization to evolve adversarial malware samples to evade the network. All 
the newly generated malwares that successfully bypass the detection model will be added 
14 
 
into the training set to retrain the detection model. The first and second part together form 
a loop as shown in Figure 1. During the training phase, this loop is iterated multiple times 
until the detection accuracy of the detection model converges to an optimal value.  
 
3.2 Dataset and Detection Model 
 
The dataset consists of 14,288 PE files. 7371 of them are malware samples, which 
were downloaded from VirusShare. The rest 6917 PE files are benign files that were 
gathered by crawling different websites. The deep neural network I trained and attacked in 
this paper is the MalConv Network proposed by Raff et al (2017). Figure 2 shows the 
detailed structure of MalConv Network. MalConv takes in up to k bytes data as input. Each 
byte is represented by a number A = {0, … ,255}. The k bytes ∈ Ak data that are extracted 
from input file are padded with zeros to form a vector x (if there are more than k bytes in 
the file, just take the first k bytes without padding). Then each element of vector x is fed 
into a trainable embedding layer to get an embedded vector z of 8 elements. After this 
embedding process, one dimensional vector x becomes a matrix Z ∈ Rdx8. This matrix Z is 
then fed into two layers 1-d convolutional layers. These two layers use Rectified Linear 
Unit (ReLU) and sigmoidal activation functions respectively. By combining these two 
layers with gating, the vanishing gradient problem caused by sigmoidal activation 
functions is avoided. The obtained values are then fed to a temporal max pooling layer 
followed by a fully connected layer with ReLU activations. The final classification is made 
by the probability output from the last fully connected layer as f(x). If f(x) > 0.5 then the 
sample is a benign file, otherwise it is classified as malware. 
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    Figure 2: Detection Model 
   This diagram shows the layer details of MalConv.  
 
3.3 Action Space 
  
 The action space is built on top of some PE file layout knowledge. Therefore, before 
introducing the action space, I will provide a brief description of the structure of PE files 
to better understand the actions. 
 A PE file consists of a number of headers and sections that tell the dynamic linker 
how to map the file into memory. In general, there are three types of layouts in PE: header, 
section table and data. Header is a data structure that contains basic information on the 
executables. Section table is a table that describes the characteristics of each file section. 
The data layout contains the actual data that related to each section. Malwares usually 
modify some of these structures to create malicious activities that are hard to detect. The 
stealth and sensitivity of these modifications make it even harder to alter some bytes 
without breaking the malware functionality. However, some of the sections are not 
important for the program to run. Some of them are even neglected by OS such as the 
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overlay section. By knowing such type of knowledge, I can construct the following action 
space: 
 The action space consists of 10 different actions with trainable parameters. These 
actions are inspired by Anderson et al.’s (2017) work. In their paper, they make each action 
accept random parameters to test evasion on a gradient boosted decision tree model with 
reinforcement learning. However, this randomness becomes a big issue in MDEA since 
evolutionary algorithm already introduced enough generality to the problem and more 
randomness would cause the model to not converge. Therefore, I introduce a parameter set 
corresponds to each action to make the model converge with acceptable time. 
 The actions are:  
1. Add a function to the import address table that is never used 
2. Manipulate existing section names 
3. Append bytes to extra space at the end of sections 
4. Create a new entry point 
5. Manipulate signature 
6. Manipulate debug info 
7. Pack the file 
8. Unpack the file 
9. Modify header checksum 
10.  Append bytes to overlay section. 
Note that some of these actions are not recoverable such as delete a signature, which 
means once the evolutionary optimization algorithm chooses to perform this action, all 
later generations of this malware will not be able to effectively perform the same action 
again. This irreversibility causes the diversity to drop drastically. I addressed this issue 
with more details in the experiment chapter later. 
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3.4 Evolutionary Optimization 
 
 I used a framework called DEAP (Distributed Evolutionary Algorithms in Python) 
to construct our evolutionary optimization algorithm. The evolutionary algorithm consists 
of three major parts: population initialization and evolution, binary modification and 
individual evaluation. Figure 3 shows an overview of the evolution algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Evolutionary Algorithm 
                This diagram shows the evolutionary optimization cycle 
 
The population evolution part has different methods to breed new children to 
evolve. Mutation and crossover as two major evolution methods. Mutation alters one or 
more gene values in a chromosome from its initial state. In mutation, the solution may 
change entirely from the previous solution. There are many different types of mutation 
such as shrink mutation (Ronco et al. 2013), uniform mutation and boundary mutation etc. 
I chose to implement the “mutShuffleIndexes” method in DEAP since most of the mutation 
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method only works for integers or floats and cannot be applied to action sequences. The 
“mutShuffleIndexes” method shuffles the attributes of the input individual. During the 
shuffle phase, there is also a probability to replace some of the elements in those attributes 
with randomly chosen elements. Crossover combines the genetic information of two 
parents to generate new offspring. It is one way to stochastically generate 
new solutions from an existing population, and analogous to the crossover that happens 
during sexual reproduction in biology. I implemented the uniform crossover method, 
which chooses each attribute from either parent with equal probability resulting in 
offspring which inherit more genetic information from one parent than the other. Selection 
is another important method in evolutionary algorithm. After the population is evolved, the 
action sequence will be sent to the binary modification section to produce modified 
malwares. The modified malwares will be evaluated by the detection model and the 
statistics for evolving next generation will be calculated. After the evaluation step, 
selection method picks the best offspring as the parent for next generation. For the 
perspective of simplicity, I implemented the “selectBest” selection algorithm for this 
project.  This cycle continues until there is enough data for further training, or the 
generation limit is reached.  
Let us denote all the malwares that got detected as Md and all the malwares that 
were not detected as Mn, then I want to find a function f(x) that makes f(Md) = Mn. The 
function f(x) is presented by action sequences {(a0, p0), (a1, p1), (a2, p2) … (ai, pi)} where ai 
is an action from action space and pi is the corresponding parameter for that action (i.e.: 
for appending overlay method, p indicates how many bytes append at the end). Our 
evolutionary optimization then aims to find a group of f(x) by crossover, mutation and 
selection. Let us denote the detection model as D(x), and for any malware sample m, if 
D(m) > 0.5, m is benign software. For each individual md in Md, our evolutional model can 
be expressed by:  
Equation 1: fopt(md) = argmax(D(f(md)). 
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With Equation 1, the overall algorithm for the evolution is expressed in the 
following form: 
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                       Chapter 4: Experiments 
 This chapter will discuss the experimental setups and results. Section 4.1 describes 
the details of the datasets, the division of training set and validation set, and the hardware 
I used to run this experiment. Section 4.2 describes the experimental results and their 
importance with two data graphs. Section 4.3 discusses the dead species problem I 
encountered during the experiment. Section 4.4 shows how evolutionary algorithm can 
overfit to a never-seen develpment set and potential solutions to the overfit problem. 
Section 4.5 presents the result of test modified malwares test against VirusTotal, a popular 
malware detection website. 
 
4.1 Experimental Setup 
 
 To set up the experiment I collected 7371 malware samples from VirusShare, a 
malware sample data website, and 6917 benign samples from web crawling. All these 
14,288 samples are Windows Portable Executables (PE). I divided dataset into two sets 
with 9:1 ratio as training set and validation set. I ran both neural network training and 
evolutionary optimization method on Texas Advanced Computing Center (TACC) 
Maverick2 server with 4 Nvidia 1080-TI GPUs and 16 Intel Xeon CPUs. The training time 
for detection network was around 10 hours and the running time for evolutionary 
optimization was around 24 hours each cycle. I recorded the accuracy and the number of 
modified bytes after each cycle.  
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4.2 Experimental Result 
 
This section presents the experimental result. The result graphs are shown in Figure 
4 and 5. 
 
          
 
   Figure 4: Detection rate against number of cycles 
 This graph shows how detection accuracy changed with number of cycles  
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Figure 5: Detection rate against number of modified bytes 
This graph shows how detection accuracy changed with number of modified bytes 
 
 
 Figure 4 shows the detection accuracy of the detection model increases with the 
number of cycles. After 10 cycles of training, which is around 12 days, the accuracy 
increases from 90% to around 93%. Note that there is a drop on the Cycle 4 in the graph, 
which I suspect that is caused by a dead species issue.  Section 4.3 addresses this issue 
with detailed discussion. 
Figure 5 shows the relation between the detection accuracy and the number of 
modified bytes. I noticed that there is a big jump from 8000 bytes to 12,000 bytes. I think 
the reason why this happens is because some of the sections in the PE file have a certain 
length and when the number of modified bytes increases above a certain threshold, the 
modification bytes  start to capture more malware patterns, which increases the accuracy 
by a big margin. 
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4.3 Dead Species 
 
 
 This section discusses the dead species problem that caused the accuracy drop on 
Cycle 4 in Figure 4. There are many actions in the action space that are not reversable 
such as removing signatures, modifying checksum sections etc. If any of these actions are 
performed on the malware, a later generation will not be able to reverse it. Since it is 
unlikely to find an optimal action sequence at the beginning of evolution, picking such 
irreversible actions will drastically reduce the search space and the offspring that contain 
those actions will be stuck at bad local optimum.  
Figure 6 shows one of the examples of such dead species. There is an obvious gap 
between the normal species and the dead species after certain number of modified bytes. 
After investigating the records of these two evolutions, the result showed that the dead 
species picked “delete-checksum” and “remove signature” actions when number of 
modified bytes was equal to 15,879. This result validates my conjecture that irreversible 
actions caused the dead species problem. 
In order to solve this problem, validation weights are introduced into the 
evolutionary optimization algorithm. These weights represent the probability of each 
action being picked. The actions that can cause dead species are assigned with a very low 
probability. This countermeasure worked well in practice and increased the average 
accuracy by 1%. However, the validation weights only delay the occurrence of dead 
species instead of solving the problem. Any individuals that picked irreversible actions 
will lead to dead species and lose their diversity in evolution. Further possible techniques 
for dealing with this problem will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 6: Example of dead species 
This graph shows the performance difference between a dead species and normal species. 
The big gap of the two lines shows how dead species can affect the performance. 
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4.4 Overfitting to Development Set  
 
 
 
 During the experimental results evaluation phase, there were some abnormalities 
in the results. While most of the detection accuracy lies within the range of 93%, few 
results are above 95% accuracy. With further research, this phenomenon is likely an 
instance of overfitting to the development set: repetitively checking against the 
development set and tuning based on the (Blum et al. 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to 
construct a unseen test set to check the true accuracy. Due to the computation limit, the 
size of the unseen test set is only 10% of the normal development set. The following 
Table 1 shows the result. 
  
Normal Development Set 
Acc 
True Test set Acc Accuracy Difference 
95.43% 92.55% 2.88% 
95.52% 92.71% 2.81% 
92.89% 92.69% 0.2% 
92.94% 92.79% 0.15% 
    
Table 1: True Test Set Accuracy Difference Table 
 
  
The first two rows are the abnormal results. It is clear that the accuracy drops 
significantly comparing to the other two accuracies. With this result, it is sufficient to 
conclude that evolutionary learning causes overfitting to development set and the evolved 
model should be checked against a test set that is not used in evolution.  
Recently, there are a few literatures proposed different method to solve this 
development set overfitting issue (Feldman et al 2019, Russo et al 2019). These issues 
will be discussed specifically in Chapter 5. 
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4.5 Comparison to a Signature-based Approach 
 
 In order to compare MDEA to a popular signature based anti-virus program, I 
submitted some modified malwares to VirusTotal, a website that scan files with multiple 
anti-virus engines to detect malware. 
 
 
Figure 7: Original Malware Sample 
 The result from VirusTotal by submitting unmodified malware sample 
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   Figure 8: Break Optional Header Checksum 
             The result from VirusTotal by submitting a modified malware sample. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7 shows the detection result from VirusTotal for the original malware 
sample. It clearly detected the malware. Figure 8 shows the detection result for a 
modified malware where I performed a single action to break its optional header 
checksum. In this case, only 3 out of 71 engines classified the malware sample as 
malware. In the meantime, MDEA classified this file as malware with over 99% 
confidence. Although more experimental analysis is need, this simple example suggests 
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that Deep Neural network approach is superior to traditional signature approach to 
malware detection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
Chapter 5 Discussion and Future Work 
This chapter will explain the design choices for MDEA. This section also evaluates 
how well the current approach worked and what could be improved in future work. 
There are several design choices to be discussed here. The first one is the detection 
model, i.e. the MalConv network (Raff et al. 2017). Several malware detection methods 
were researched such as malware images (Nataraj et al. 2011), n-gram k nearest neighbor 
(Kaggle 2015), and LSTM sequence model (Yang et al. 2018) etc. After testing with the 
dataset, MalConv achieved the highest detection accuracy, therefore, MalConv is chosen 
as the detection network.  
Another design choice is to use evolutionary algorithm (EA) as the optimization 
method to generate malware samples instead of GANs and reinforcement learning (RL). 
EA has several advantages compared to GAN and reinforcement learning. Existing GANs 
(GAN and its variants) suffer from training problems such as instability and mode collapse. 
EA can achieve a more stable training process. GANs usually employ a pre-defined 
adversarial objective function alternating training a generator and a discriminator (Wang 
et al. 2019). However, the action space cannot be simply expressed as a single adversarial 
objective function. EA solves this problem by evolving a population of different adversarial 
objective functions (different action sequences). Compared to RL, EA does not need to 
backpropagate the action weights and biases, which makes the code shorter and 2-3 times 
faster in practice. EA is also highly parallelizable compared to RL since it only requires 
individuals to communicate a few scalars between each other. Finally, EA is also more 
robust in the perspective of scaling (Salimans et al. 2017). It is very easy to extend the 
action space and other parameters to achieve a different learning outcome. With the above 
benefits, EA was chosen instead of GANs or RL. 
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The current setup of MDEA increases detection accuracy from 90% to 93 %. Even 
though the result is promising, there are still some problems that can be fixed. First, the 
evolutionary optimization still suffers from the dead species problem. The validation 
weights introduced in Section 4.3 only delay the occurrence of dead species instead of 
solving it. One possible solution is adding an age function in the evolutionary optimization 
process to mark the generations and study the relation between the dead species and age. 
With the age function, it is possible to find the optimal age for each irreversible actions. 
Then, the final solution will only be selected from the correct age generation. 
The overfitting problem of evolutionary optimization is another field for future 
study. The current solution is to use a unseen test set (described in Section 4.4). However, 
this solution requires more data gathering time and can only be applied once. Recently, 
Feldman et al. (2019) showed the benefits that multiple classes have on the amount of 
overfitting caused by reusing development set. With their theory and method, I can extend 
the malware detection problem to multi-class malware classification problem, and the 
overfitting of development set can be reduced. The future plan is to relabel each malware 
samples into different malware classes and convert the detection problem into a multi-class 
classification problem to alleviate overfitting. 
Another future plan is to expand the search space for the evolutionary optimization 
algorithm by defining more modification actions. The number of actions in the action space 
is one of the key factors to ensure the diversity and generality of the evolutionary 
optimization. However, because of the fragility and sensitivity of binary EXE code, it is 
very hard to create new modification action without changing the functionality of the 
program 
The size and generality of the dataset can also be improved further. Since the search 
space is constrained by the diversity of malware types, adding different kinds of malware 
into the dataset can potentially improve the optimal detection accuracy. The input size of 
the detection model can also be further increased. Currently, MDEA takes in two million 
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bytes as the input. There are many malware samples in the dataset that have more than two 
million bytes and the extra bytes are cut off because of the length limit. The plan is to run 
MDEA with larger GPU memories, so that more data can be taken into the detection model, 
which may result in better performance. In addition, it is necessary to run an analysis in the 
future on how randomly modified malwares can influence the detection model. By 
conducting this validation, the significance of the evolutionary optimization algorithm can 
be verified.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion  
In this thesis, I proposed MDEA, an evolutionary adversarial malware detection 
model that combines neural networks with evolutionary optimization and generates attack 
samples to solve the evasion attack problem and to increase detection accuracy. An action 
space is introduced, which contains 10 different binary modification actions. The 
evolutionary algorithm evolves different action sequences by picking actions from the 
action space and then tests different action sequences against the detection model. After 
successfully evolving action sequences that bypass the detection model, all these action 
sequences will be applied to corresponding malware samples to form new training set for 
the detection model. By training the network with this cycle, detection accuracy increased 
from 90% to around 93 % even with limited computing power. 
These results show that deep learning-based malware detection can defend against 
adversarial attacks and accuracy can be further improved by evolutionary learning. 
Evolutionary optimization provides generality and diversity that is difficult to achieve by 
other optimization algorithms. 
I believe that MDEA represents a great method to solve adversarial attack on 
malware detection network. 
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